The Gorchurra of the Anglo-Sikh Wars

 

We have been on a literary and historical journey together. We began with the cavalry fighting at Mudki.

We then looked at the Bengal Native Cavalry and the British Cavalry.  Both regulars as we define such things. 

We saw the effectiveness of the Indian Irregular Cavalry in British employ. 

 

Today, we arrive at our destination.  We can now establish the tactical methods of the Sikh Gorchurra. Before we do so let us say why this is an important matter. Without understanding what the Gorchurra did on the battlfield we cannot make sense of the battles of the Anglo-Sikh Wars.

My own account of the Battle of Mudki relied on the latest and most complete research from Amarpal Singh-Sidhu.  I was at the time confident when I wrote: 

"On both flanks the British cavalry prevailed."

As we have seen this was incorrect.  True, the British cavalry charged through the Gorchurra. That is indisputable. What I missed was the terrible price that the Gorchurra extracted for that passage. Nor did that event render the Gorchurra defeated.

Were I to write about Mudki today I could not say "the British cavalry prevailed."  That alone changes our understanding of Mudki. Now, to Gorchurra tactics:

The Gorchurra were not arrayed in the formal lines of Regular cavalry.  They were excellent horsemen and well armed.  As we would expect with irregular troops armament was a matter of purse and preference. Lances, swords, and muskets, other weapons too.  They shot from the saddle, mostly. 

 

Nolan says sometimes they adopted a mixed formation of horse and foot.  The horseman protecting a shooting foot man on occassion.  He thought the British cavalry might do the same should the need arise.

Back in the days of Guru Gobind the Gorchurra had adopted a tactic the Sikhs called Dhai Phat.  Here we have an early European description.

"The men are accustomed to charge on full gallop, on a sudden they stop, discharge their pieces with deliberate aim, when suddenly wheeling about, after 3 or 4 turns, they renew the attack."

Dhai Phat had been devised to combat the Moghuls and the Afghans.  Against the British we can see it had evolved.  It still had 3, the Sikhs liked to say 2 and a half, parts to it. Fire, evade, attack.

When confronted by British cavalry some of the Gorchurra attempted to shoot down the opposing officers.  Like so, my emphasis:

"The Sikhs commenced a desultory matchlock fire. Unett steadily advanced, but the 5th, put into confusion by this reception, went about and fled in the greatest precipitation, in spite of the most earnest entreaties of their officers, of whom several received wounds."

This then, was individual aimed fire and not without effect.  It was not a volley.

Should the British charge the Gorchurra opened out to let them through. This was not simply a matter of getting out of the way.  It seems to have been finely calculated as we see below.  My emphasis.

"A squadron of the 3rd dragoons, under Major Tinett, charged a goel of Sikh horsemen, and the Major himself told me that they opened out, giving just sufficient room for our squadron to enter." 

Note that the British squadron is not given free passage on mass.

"The 3rd, forcing their way through the hostile ranks," 

Some individual combat might take place at this stage.  The real danger though was for the British trooper who had passed his foe.

 “Picture to yourself a British or Anglo-Indian trooper dashing onwards with a most uncontrollable horse, and a Goorchurra or Sikh horseman, after allowing his enemy to pass, turning quickly round to deal him an ugly wound on the back of the head."

That being a demonstration of the last stage of the Dhai Phat. 

As we have previously seen such a British force might end its charge diminished and dispersed and well clear of their opponents.  The latter turning to face and very ready to repeat the process.

 

Regular cavalry, British or Native, achieved very little against Gorchurra.  This is obscurred in post battle accounts of gallant cavalry charges.  They did take place but mostly cannot be said to have defeated the Gorchurra.

When a protracted melee took place the regulars had less control of their horses, less effective weapons and less freedom of movement than the Gorchurra.  Mostly they got the worse of it.

As Nolan observed, my emphasis again:

"Had our men worn arms like these in the last Sikh war, the enemy's horsemen would not have met them with such confidence in single combat."

None of this means the Gorchurra were some type of super warriors.  As we have seen when they met Indian Irregular Cavalry the outcomes were very different.  Both sets of combatants enjoyed the same advantages.

They disliked facing artillery.

Against steady regular infantry the Gorchurra needed to find a flank or the rear of the foe.  The threat of a Gorchurra charge could force British regulars to form square, and it did. 

Against steady regular infantry fire power the Gorchurra could expect severe casualties. It was not their style of fighting. Against retreating disordered infantry they wreaked havoc.

All of the foregoing articles drawing on Nolan further our understanding of how cavalry actions in the Anglo-Sikh Wars were fought.  

My initial motivation, alongside historical interest, was how to represent this on the table top. 

I hope to have something soon.  I believe it might be accomplished within the parameters of Barry Hilton's Republic to Empire.  An Anglo-Sikh War Appendix if you like.

You can see some of my Gorchurra on this page.  The basing is intended to indicate that they were not regular cavalry. 

 

The British Cavalry in the Anglo-Sikh Wars

 

 Nolan, as we have noted, was campaigning for a reform of the British Cavalry.  He had detailed what he thought was required.  Having dealt with the deficencies of the Indian Regular Cavalry, outlined the advantages of the British paid Indian Irregular Cavalry he moved to a more delicate matter.  The performance of the British Cavalry.  He fortifies the lines of his argument with suitably Imperial prose.

 "How comes it, if our system is good, that such men of less physical and moral courage, mounted on such inferior animals, should have been able to cope with our English dragoons ?

This was a neccissary precaution; any criticism of the British Cavalry officers and men would have doomed his project.  The Army was protective of its reputation. Yet, it was not all policy. He was writing about his friends and his Army. 

For these reasons he does not mention what happened to Pope's cavalry at Chillianwallah. There, the advancing British cavalry met advancing Gorchurra.  Pope was hit to the back of the head with a tulwar.  He had to be escorted from the field. 

Shortly after engaging, almost his entire cavalry, British and Indian regulars to a man, panicked and fled the field. A smaller group of British and Indian cavalry hidden by jungle were not engaged and remained in place.

The Gorchurra vigorously pursued, over running the British Field Hospital in the process.   The resulting attempts to pin the blame were carried out with equal energy. 

Pope was reduced to writing and publishing a letter stating it couldn't have been his fault as he was no longer present in command.  Gough sternly noted that fact but offered no further vindication.

Singh-Sidhu thinks the high level of officer casualties indicates many officers attempted to stem the route.  Bravely then, but to no avail. 

Not all officers did, one of Gough's aides rode over to help rally the troopers. Having tried to physically restrain an officer from running away he gave up.  His verdict was severe, "Poltroons".

There was theatre too. At a subsequent formal parade a trumpeter rode up to the senior Commander and declared his own colonel to be a coward. An early whistle-blower?  I'd say not. The brave were dead, and the poltroons were living in fear of exposure.  A scapegoat was needed.

A senior British cavalry officer was driven to suicide as a consequence of continued malicious allegations.  

Grim stuff.

Nolan omits these events from his thesis. Sensibly so, given his purposes. Yet, his target audience could hardly read what he does provide without bringing them to mind. In that way his ommission re-enforced his argument. An astute move.

Let us now look at the examples Nolan gives of the British cavalry combat experiences of fighting the Gorchurra. 

We  have already seen what happened at Mudki and later. Here is the link if you missed it first time.  https://youdonotknowthenorth.blogspot.com/2023/08/an-incident-at-mudki-anglo-sikh-wars.html

There is more, much emphasising the sharpness of the native indian swords.  This was not due to origin of manufacture. British Irregular Indian cavalry used rehilted and sharpened British made blades to great effect.  The problem was steel scabbards that blunted the blade. Indians used wooden scabbards.

When an Indian blade struck it cut deep.  Limbs could be, and were, severed.

"One officer, who was in the campaign, said he saw an English dragoon putting his hands to the reins to try and turn his horse, when a Native horseman dropping his sword across them, took off both hands above the wrist."

"A squadron of the 3rd dragoons, under Major Tinett, charged a goel of Sikh horsemen, and the Major himself told me that they opened out, giving just sufficient room for our squadron to enter."

 Once again we see the Gorchurra tactic of opening out.

"The dragoon on the left of the front rank, going in at the charge, gave point at the Sikh next him ; the sword stuck in the lower part of his body, but did not penetrate sufficiently to disable him; so the Sikh cut back, hit the dragoon across the mouth, and took his head clean off."

"for at the battle of Chillianwalla they tell of a Sikh horseman challenging the English to single combat and unhorsing three dragoons (the first, a lancer, had the lance- pole severed and his forefinger taken off at one blow) before he (the Sikh) was shot down ! !"

If I have made the correct connection the Sikh in question was a Nihang or Akali. A Sikh warrior religious Order. He had on some previous occasion lost an arm in combat.  Presumably his left one, although as he may have been left handed; Who knows?  How did he control his horse? With his knees, probably. Reins between the teeth? It was not unknown.

"their trenchant blades would have sword across the arm or leg left; the bold Englishmen at their mercy, and they soon hacked them to pieces."

The point being if you cut the riders bridle arm he has lost control of his mount. He then cannot fight. A deep cut through the left leg produces the same result.

"A huge dragoon of the regiment, was found quite dead: his head had dropped forward from a cut on the back of the neck, which had severed the spine; and at this very action, " it is said,' that, whilst our poor fellows laboured in vain to draw blood, a touch from the Sikh's sword across the arm or leg left the bold Englishmen at their mercy, and they soon hacked them to pieces."

Note the disadvantages of a blunt sword.  It was not a new problem. Steve J, in previous comments, noted it in the Peninsula.  Napier had this to say:

" The cavalry steel scabbard is noisy, which is bad; heavy, which is worse; and it destroys the weapon's sharp edge, which is worst. The native wooden scabbard is best." — Gen. Sir Charles Napier.

We may ask how bad did it get?  This next provides an answer:

"A Sikh, after the retreat of our cavalry at Chillianwalla, galloped up to the horse- artillery, cut down and killed the two men on the leading horses of the gun, one after the other, and approached the third, a cool fellow, who, seeing how hadly his comrades had come off with their swords, instead of drawing his, stuck to his whip, with which he flogged off his assailant's horse, and thus saved himself !"

The troopers were trained to use their swords.  Their swords wouldn't cut being blunt edged.  We see the results on this page.

"Captain Fitzgerald, of the 14th dragoons, received a sword -wound at Rumnugger, from the effects of which he died. A Sikh, on foot, crouched under a shield, cut at him from behind. The sword exposed the spinal marrow, entering the skull at the same time."

I think that is the unfortunate Captain prone in the painting above. The Gorchurra seem to have had a penchant for back of the head strikes.

" The propensity of the Sikhs to aim their cuts at the back of the head was so unequivocally manifested on the 22nd of November, that it became an object of consideration to the officers of the army to provide some defence, however slight, for the precious caput."

" Some officers wrapped rolls of linen cloth round the back of the csako, the folds of which hung down over their backs, affording some protection."

The British cavalrymen also found it diffcult to injure the Gorchurra.  This was not just a question of blunt swords. The latter caused similar difficulties against Russian great coats in the Crimean War. 

Note from the following drawn from above my emphasis.

"gave point at the Sikh next him ; the sword stuck in the lower part of his body, but did not penetrate sufficiently to disable him;"

Some British(and native) regular cavalry were lancers.  How did they fare?  Famously, the 16th broke into a Sikh square.  

 

It was a high point of the campaign for the British cavalry.  Nolan has this to tell us.

" The 16th Lancers broke into the Sikh squares at Aliwal, and in the melee that ensued these brave men attacked the lancers sword in hand and brought many of them low, for they could effect nothing with the lance."

I will note that the Lancers did not take to their own swords. Perhaps they had no confidence in them ?  Nolan, makes no comment on that prefering to add:

"it was because those who failed did not know that it requires speed to drive a lance home, and that it must be carried into the object by the horse."

This is a proven truth, and once in or adjacent to the square the horses lacked momentum. Yet, perhaps a sharp lance head is preferable to a blunt sword edge-even in a confined space.

 " In the second Sikh war, I have been told that our lancers often failed in driving their lances into a Sikh, because they had shawls wrapped round them." 

I have seen before mentions of the protective nature of Sikh clothing, shawls and turbans. A Gorchurra, low in the saddle, turbaned and with his shield on his back was hard to injure.  Of course some of them were armoured too and helmets also appear.

Nolan then gets into his stride asking the pertinent question.

" And what does a charge resolve itself into, when the enemy are bold, but a melee or a series of single combats ?"

The issue being the British cavalry would (ideally, and in fairness mostly did ) boldly charge, the Gorchurra open out, and blows exchanged. Then, if the British did not shoot through the gaps and disperse. A melee must occur.

In that melee, the British trooper would be disadvantaged.  He had less control of his horse, bad saddle, long stirrups.  His sword was blunt, steel scabbard.  His tight uniform impeded his movements. 

Nolan knows how the cavalry should be armed, clothed and equipped to remove these disadvantages.  

He has already made the case in respect of the Bengal Native cavalry and now draws the obvious conclusion:

“Now if this system, which has had a fair trial, has been found so bad in the East, why should it be supposed to be excellent when applied to our own dragoons? The colour of the men cannot make the system: the innate courage of the British soldier carries him into the midst of the enemy, not confidence in the power of the weapon he wields; for, when he has got among the enemy he can do no execution, — partly because he has no command over his horse, and partly because his sword is not sharp enough to penetrate.”

“If a native horseman should not be put in a helpless seat with long stirrups, and should not be tightened by his dress, or suffocated by a leather stock; if it is necessary for him to have a sword that will cut down an enemy at a blow, — are these things less necessary to the English dragoon? or, if not quite so necessary, would they not add greatly to his efficiency in the field?”

Nolan concludes:

"Had our men worn arms like these in the last Sikh war, the enemy's horsemen would not have met them with such confidence in single combat."

From which we must deduce that the Gorchurra did not have a "wholesome dread of the English dragoon."

Earlier in this series of posts I conjectured that Unett's squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons may have lost up to a third of its number in the fight with the Gorchurra.  I was wrong and this seems a good place to correct the record.  Below is an extract from the website of the 3rd Light Dragoons.

"From Captain Unett’s squadron of 3^rd King’s Own Light Dragoons of 106 men, only 48 were in the saddle at the end of the battle."

As you can see the losses were over 50% rather than near a third.

Nolan has given us great insights into how the Sikh Wars were fought. That was not his purpose or his focus. Rather, it provided him with useful contemorary evidence to make his case for cavalry reform.  For this reason we can trust his account.

For the last in this series we will look at the Gorchurra.