The Crimean War by Hugh Small-A Review

Hugh Small's diligent research reveals a very different war to that presented by generations of British Historians.  Usefully, he also manages to give us glimpses of the contemporary Russian perspective.  He hopes, the book was first published in 2007, that further revelations will emerge from the Russian Military archives.  That, of course, would greatly aid our in depth understanding of the Campaign.

To this reviewer's eye the Author sometimes gets carried away on a rather skittish hobby horse.     Never-the-less this is a valuable volume.  In particular, Small traces the original misrepresentation of the Campaign to A.W Kinglake, Lord Raglan's nephew and defender.  Successive writers simply fell into step.

Let us to the Alma.  Here Small offers us a stark conclusion and some compelling evidence.  The Minié rifle slaughtered the outnumbered Russian infantry in their droves.  Its users did so with impunity.  Their weapon was accurate to 1000 yards versus the Russian musket’s 100 yards.   Men using the Minié rifle  could also shoot down artillery crews well beyond the range of retaliatory Grape Shot.

Elsewhere on the field, by accident (the Guards) or design (De Lacy Evans) the British infantry stood off and blazed away.  The Guards Division alone, put twenty thousand rounds into the 15,000 Russians who opposed them.

The French Zouaves on the Heights, more systematically with their Algerian experience, performed the same trick.

For Small the Alma was a triumph for the free thinking British private soldier who, en masse, ignored his hidebound officers and did what he thought was right. Thus, proving the officers and generals wrong and inadequate. 

 

This is a serious misreading of the British Army in the Crimea (or anywhere else).  Its watch words were steadiness and firepower.  At the Alma steadiness failed but (greatly improved) firepower won out. 

The private soldiers were quicker than the officers to appreciate how the Minié rifle  changed warfare.  That said overt free thinking could still earn them a flogging.  Whatever the Battle of the Alma was it was not an experiment in radical democracy.

Likewise, Small’s treatment of The Charge is a mixed bag.  Much valuable information combined with bloody spurs for the Author’s foam spattered hobby horse.  Yet, it is worth reading. 

At the end though, no matter how well the troopers had performed, the Russians still had the British guns. Worse, the Light Brigade was finished for the Campaign as a viable military formation.

The ‘thin red streak’ incident is covered.  I am sympathetic to Small’s view that Sir Colin Campbell famous words actually referred to when his troops opened fire rather than any attempt to close with the Russian cavalry.

Scarlett’s uphill charge is well described but the results are overstated.  The French, who enjoyed a better War than their British allies, certainly did not subscribe to Small’s notion that the Russian cavalry had been irrevocably cowed by fighting their British counterparts.

So, to Sevastopol. Here Small does great service in uncovering the mendacious and deceitful behaviour of Lord Raglan that cost so many lives.  We discover, to this reviewer’s surprise, that both the British and French Governments actually did know what they were doing.  Their joint ‘open country’ strategy, suborned by their own Commanders, might well have succeeded.  The divergent fates of the two suborners, Raglan and Pélissier, is salutary.

As it was, during the siege, the advantages of the Minié rifle were negated by innovative "Ferguson" engineering works and the tenacity of the Russian soldier. The Butcher's Bill was horrific for all combatants.

There’s more too.  The naval campaign and Florence Nightingale appear as does Mrs Seacole’s Pub. 

Enough. Small’s book causes us to re think what we thought we knew. No mean achievement for any writer.   

If you are interested in the Crimean War this book is for you.