Bringing up the Guns- Anglo-Sikh Wars

 

Yes, it is Elephant Time.  As you know elephants were used to pull field artillery in the Anglo-Sikh Wars. In 1857 too. I have 6 in all.

These are from Dixon’s Indian Mutiny range. Very nice indeed. Gun from Fighting 15s, gunners from QRF.

Nothing says India like an elephant.  

I have been careful to keep my elephants neutral, both sides can use them.  

Before buying the Dixon Nellies I bought some from Fighting 15s.  These are smaller creatures but attractively done. Their main demerit is that no limbers are supplied. Luckily for me Irregular Miniatures helped out with three Elephant Limbers. As you might expect Irregular sell elephants with limbers but that was not where I found myself.

You see the resulting combination here.  Passable I think.

 

This last is actually a Rajah’s Elephant. I had intended it for Duleep Singh. Alas, I find that Prince’s life is too tragic to contemplate-even in 15mm. His elephant now pulls a gun. 

Should you want an infant Maharajah on an elephant try QRF.  They have a splendid one.

I have a couple of bullock pulled limbers too. Here is one.  All very much end of project stuff you might think.  You would be right.

The Sikh Army in 15mm

 

Above, two units of armoured Gorchurra.  This is the Sikh nobility heavily invested in the continuance of the Sikh State. Equipment apart they fought in exactly the same fashion as the less wealthy Gorchurra.

We see them again with their less well armoured compatriots.   

My first brigade of Khalsa Regulars, four battalions in all. Depending on where and when Khalsa Regulars might be rated as Veteran, Drilled elite or Recruit Elite.  Exceptionally, like the Sikh Brigades at Mudki, Veteran Elite.

My second Khalsa brigade comprising of three battalions.

My third brigade of Khalsa Regulars.  Four battalions. 

I have nearly enough figures for another battalion. Well, maybe I will bring them up to strength later on.

I have three brigades of Sikh Regular Cavalry raised and trained on the French Model.

Sikh Regular Cuirassiers above.

Sikh Regular Lancers with supporting Horse Artillery.

Sikh Regular Dragoons.  I need to glue on a couple of flags detached during re-basing.

Something different here.  Akali or Nihangs religiously devoted warriors.  Three units.  The black and red bordered flag is historically attested.

The sort of force that might turn out to defend their locality.  Ordinary farmers who could shoot and handle a sword.  Note the guns.  The Punjab didn't lack for ordinance.

More Gorchurra.  Note the supporting Camel gunners. I'm rating them as ultra light guns.

Another assembly of Sikh Levies above.

A closer look at the unarmoured Gorchurra above and below.

Last, but certainly not least the Sikh Regular Artillery.

Two batteries, tubes cast in Lahore.  

The excellent Sikh gunners were in fact Moslems.  The Sikh State was multi confessional.

And, bar an elephant or three to pull the guns, that's it.  Oh, I have some bullock teams on order too. 

Now we need to try them out.

A British Army for the Anglo-Sikh Wars

My Anglo-Sikh War collection began in the last century. Consequently this post will remind me of what I have and what I might need to add.  Above, the Rifles.

I also need to rate my forces for the Anglo-Sikh Wars.  It has occasioned much thought and some revisions to my previous thinking.  Research will do that.  A good thing and of course the thinking doesn’t stop.

Mostly the British liked a 2-1 combination. That is two native units to one British one.  The latter could be Company or HM.  Apart from the irregulars all were trained in the British manner. Drilled seems a reasonable category for all of the Regulars.

There is the question of superiority of British units.  In fact there was little observable difference in performance or staying power. Yet, the British commanders thought that there was. To model this I’m trying out the British units as Drilled Elite and the Sepoys and Sowars as simply Drilled.

A second question is what of the vaunted British Fire Power?  Experimentally I intend to limit the potential +D3 result to British Infantry units. Sepoys will not benefit.

The cavalry also followed the 2-1 model

Another Brigade.  Note the Governor General's Body Guard in the back rank.

The final Regular cavalry Brigade. It could do with another unit of Bengal Native Cavalry.  Or, maybe I will just attach the Horse Artillery.

The Indian irregular cavalry were a key component of the Army.  You see three such units below.

The British fielded a lot of artillery often of lighter calibre that that of the Sikhs.

You see all of my British artillery below.

I realise I have no Bengal Native Artillery.

No shortage of guns though.

Various British Commanders below including two versions of Sir Hugh Gough.  Governor General Hardinge's there too.

You can see my entire Anglo-Sikh War British Collection on this page. It has been quite a journey. We will see the Sikhs next time. 

The Gorchurra of the Anglo-Sikh Wars

 

We have been on a literary and historical journey together. We began with the cavalry fighting at Mudki.

We then looked at the Bengal Native Cavalry and the British Cavalry.  Both regulars as we define such things. 

We saw the effectiveness of the Indian Irregular Cavalry in British employ. 

 

Today, we arrive at our destination.  We can now establish the tactical methods of the Sikh Gorchurra. Before we do so let us say why this is an important matter. Without understanding what the Gorchurra did on the battlfield we cannot make sense of the battles of the Anglo-Sikh Wars.

My own account of the Battle of Mudki relied on the latest and most complete research from Amarpal Singh-Sidhu.  I was at the time confident when I wrote: 

"On both flanks the British cavalry prevailed."

As we have seen this was incorrect.  True, the British cavalry charged through the Gorchurra. That is indisputable. What I missed was the terrible price that the Gorchurra extracted for that passage. Nor did that event render the Gorchurra defeated.

Were I to write about Mudki today I could not say "the British cavalry prevailed."  That alone changes our understanding of Mudki. Now, to Gorchurra tactics:

The Gorchurra were not arrayed in the formal lines of Regular cavalry.  They were excellent horsemen and well armed.  As we would expect with irregular troops armament was a matter of purse and preference. Lances, swords, and muskets, other weapons too.  They shot from the saddle, mostly. 

 

Nolan says sometimes they adopted a mixed formation of horse and foot.  The horseman protecting a shooting foot man on occassion.  He thought the British cavalry might do the same should the need arise.

Back in the days of Guru Gobind the Gorchurra had adopted a tactic the Sikhs called Dhai Phat.  Here we have an early European description.

"The men are accustomed to charge on full gallop, on a sudden they stop, discharge their pieces with deliberate aim, when suddenly wheeling about, after 3 or 4 turns, they renew the attack."

Dhai Phat had been devised to combat the Moghuls and the Afghans.  Against the British we can see it had evolved.  It still had 3, the Sikhs liked to say 2 and a half, parts to it. Fire, evade, attack.

When confronted by British cavalry some of the Gorchurra attempted to shoot down the opposing officers.  Like so, my emphasis:

"The Sikhs commenced a desultory matchlock fire. Unett steadily advanced, but the 5th, put into confusion by this reception, went about and fled in the greatest precipitation, in spite of the most earnest entreaties of their officers, of whom several received wounds."

This then, was individual aimed fire and not without effect.  It was not a volley.

Should the British charge the Gorchurra opened out to let them through. This was not simply a matter of getting out of the way.  It seems to have been finely calculated as we see below.  My emphasis.

"A squadron of the 3rd dragoons, under Major Tinett, charged a goel of Sikh horsemen, and the Major himself told me that they opened out, giving just sufficient room for our squadron to enter." 

Note that the British squadron is not given free passage on mass.

"The 3rd, forcing their way through the hostile ranks," 

Some individual combat might take place at this stage.  The real danger though was for the British trooper who had passed his foe.

 “Picture to yourself a British or Anglo-Indian trooper dashing onwards with a most uncontrollable horse, and a Goorchurra or Sikh horseman, after allowing his enemy to pass, turning quickly round to deal him an ugly wound on the back of the head."

That being a demonstration of the last stage of the Dhai Phat. 

As we have previously seen such a British force might end its charge diminished and dispersed and well clear of their opponents.  The latter turning to face and very ready to repeat the process.

 

Regular cavalry, British or Native, achieved very little against Gorchurra.  This is obscurred in post battle accounts of gallant cavalry charges.  They did take place but mostly cannot be said to have defeated the Gorchurra.

When a protracted melee took place the regulars had less control of their horses, less effective weapons and less freedom of movement than the Gorchurra.  Mostly they got the worse of it.

As Nolan observed, my emphasis again:

"Had our men worn arms like these in the last Sikh war, the enemy's horsemen would not have met them with such confidence in single combat."

None of this means the Gorchurra were some type of super warriors.  As we have seen when they met Indian Irregular Cavalry the outcomes were very different.  Both sets of combatants enjoyed the same advantages.

They disliked facing artillery.

Against steady regular infantry the Gorchurra needed to find a flank or the rear of the foe.  The threat of a Gorchurra charge could force British regulars to form square, and it did. 

Against steady regular infantry fire power the Gorchurra could expect severe casualties. It was not their style of fighting. Against retreating disordered infantry they wreaked havoc.

All of the foregoing articles drawing on Nolan further our understanding of how cavalry actions in the Anglo-Sikh Wars were fought.  

My initial motivation, alongside historical interest, was how to represent this on the table top. 

I hope to have something soon.  I believe it might be accomplished within the parameters of Barry Hilton's Republic to Empire.  An Anglo-Sikh War Appendix if you like.

You can see some of my Gorchurra on this page.  The basing is intended to indicate that they were not regular cavalry. 

 

General Gough’s Text Book Battle

 

In 1845 General Sir Hugh Gough faced an outnumbered Sikh army outside of the town of Mudki.  He was determined to demonstrate the futility of native forces facing the British in the open field.  His own army was of good quality being a combination of Company and Queen’s regiments.

To be sure the Sikh’s were an unusual force for the Sub-Continent.  They were French trained regulars with a history of battle field success.  Gough, as an old Peninsular Man, had fought the French before he felt no anxiety. 

His battle plan called for a double envelopment of the Sikh flanks.  That tactic was made famous by the Carthaginian Hannibal at Cannae.  Hannibal enjoys a reputation as one of History’s Great Captain’s. Think on that the next time you read of Gough’s “Tipperary Tactics”.

At the end of the day, the British held the battle field.  Their losses had been unacceptably high and included highly regarded senior officers and the son of a prominent Government Minister.  Gough was held responsible for mishandling the battle. 

The Sikhs fought fiercely until dark fell and then retreated in good order. They had been somewhat surprised that their General disappeared at the start of the battle.  He was, it later transpired, a traitor, already working for the British. The Sikh Brigadiers, Bahudar Singh and Metab Singh, managed well enough without him.  Mudki left the Sikh rank and file hungry for another encounter. 

As a demonstration of British military superiority, the Battle of Mudki was a failure.  The myth of Mudki was manufactured subsequent and Gough was its scapegoat.

With the benefit of modern research, we can examine what went wrong for Gough.  Pre-battle there were three factors we should consider. 

First, the British from the top down had persuaded themselves that the Sikhs would fight badly. 

This was based on intelligence reports of the influence of the panchat soldiers’ committees on the Sikh State. The British, it seems from contemporary records, believed that such “republicanism” would preclude effective military performance.  This view was promulgated through all ranks of British soldiers.

Second, the British Army arrive on the field late, hungry and thirsty after a grueling march.  British over confidence led Gough to engage on arrival.

Third, the Sikhs held an advantage of ground that stymied two of Gough’s three battle field manoeuvres.  Gough did not know the ground until his army was on it.

Let’s look at the phases of the battle now. 

Gough opened up with his artillery and bombarded the Sikh position.  He had twice as many guns as the Sikhs.  However, the Sikh guns were heavier and the Sikh gunners were better.  Also, the Sikh position was protected by sandy hillocks that proved to be excellent cover.  The British lost the artillery duel.

Gough then launched his cavalry on both flanks.  Their aim was to disperse the outnumbered Sikh cavalry and then take the Sikh infantry in the flanks and rear.  Gough made sure that he enjoyed numerical superiority on one flank. The other was more evenly matched.  The huge numbers of Sikh cavalry later credited to have participated in the battle seem to have been added subsequently.

On both flanks the British cavalry prevailed.  Attempting to complete their mission they ran into impenetrable jungle ground and were shot down by Sikh skirmishers. Gough, wisely, recalled them before too many casualties were taken.  The ground was not suitable for cavalry.  The double envelopment had failed.

Gough then closed with his infantry.  They fought hard and eventually took the field.  British casualties were high and Sikh resistance protracted and punishing.  It was this phase of the battle that was fettled, post encounter, into the myth of Gough’s sole tactic being the “Tipperary Rush”.

In sum Gough’s battlefield tactics at Mudki were sophisticated.  His army was professional and able to carry out his plan.  The plan fell apart because of over confidence and poor staff work. In the end he was forced to rely on the advantage of numbers.

Gough didn’t know who he was fighting or where he was fighting-he didn’t think it mattered.  That view was entirely shared by his staff and by Harding the Governor General of India who was present on the day.  The blame for that miscalculation was, uniquely, handed to Gough.

That is a brief analysis of the Battle of Mudki.  I find it an interesting engagement and we will revisit on the table top.