General Gough’s Text Book Battle

 

In 1845 General Sir Hugh Gough faced an outnumbered Sikh army outside of the town of Mudki.  He was determined to demonstrate the futility of native forces facing the British in the open field.  His own army was of good quality being a combination of Company and Queen’s regiments.

To be sure the Sikh’s were an unusual force for the Sub-Continent.  They were French trained regulars with a history of battle field success.  Gough, as an old Peninsular Man, had fought the French before he felt no anxiety. 

His battle plan called for a double envelopment of the Sikh flanks.  That tactic was made famous by the Carthaginian Hannibal at Cannae.  Hannibal enjoys a reputation as one of History’s Great Captain’s. Think on that the next time you read of Gough’s “Tipperary Tactics”.

At the end of the day, the British held the battle field.  Their losses had been unacceptably high and included highly regarded senior officers and the son of a prominent Government Minister.  Gough was held responsible for mishandling the battle. 

The Sikhs fought fiercely until dark fell and then retreated in good order. They had been somewhat surprised that their General disappeared at the start of the battle.  He was, it later transpired, a traitor, already working for the British. The Sikh Brigadiers, Bahudar Singh and Metab Singh, managed well enough without him.  Mudki left the Sikh rank and file hungry for another encounter. 

As a demonstration of British military superiority, the Battle of Mudki was a failure.  The myth of Mudki was manufactured subsequent and Gough was its scapegoat.

With the benefit of modern research, we can examine what went wrong for Gough.  Pre-battle there were three factors we should consider. 

First, the British from the top down had persuaded themselves that the Sikhs would fight badly. 

This was based on intelligence reports of the influence of the panchat soldiers’ committees on the Sikh State. The British, it seems from contemporary records, believed that such “republicanism” would preclude effective military performance.  This view was promulgated through all ranks of British soldiers.

Second, the British Army arrive on the field late, hungry and thirsty after a grueling march.  British over confidence led Gough to engage on arrival.

Third, the Sikhs held an advantage of ground that stymied two of Gough’s three battle field manoeuvres.  Gough did not know the ground until his army was on it.

Let’s look at the phases of the battle now. 

Gough opened up with his artillery and bombarded the Sikh position.  He had twice as many guns as the Sikhs.  However, the Sikh guns were heavier and the Sikh gunners were better.  Also, the Sikh position was protected by sandy hillocks that proved to be excellent cover.  The British lost the artillery duel.

Gough then launched his cavalry on both flanks.  Their aim was to disperse the outnumbered Sikh cavalry and then take the Sikh infantry in the flanks and rear.  Gough made sure that he enjoyed numerical superiority on one flank. The other was more evenly matched.  The huge numbers of Sikh cavalry later credited to have participated in the battle seem to have been added subsequently.

On both flanks the British cavalry prevailed.  Attempting to complete their mission they ran into impenetrable jungle ground and were shot down by Sikh skirmishers. Gough, wisely, recalled them before too many casualties were taken.  The ground was not suitable for cavalry.  The double envelopment had failed.

Gough then closed with his infantry.  They fought hard and eventually took the field.  British casualties were high and Sikh resistance protracted and punishing.  It was this phase of the battle that was fettled, post encounter, into the myth of Gough’s sole tactic being the “Tipperary Rush”.

In sum Gough’s battlefield tactics at Mudki were sophisticated.  His army was professional and able to carry out his plan.  The plan fell apart because of over confidence and poor staff work. In the end he was forced to rely on the advantage of numbers.

Gough didn’t know who he was fighting or where he was fighting-he didn’t think it mattered.  That view was entirely shared by his staff and by Harding the Governor General of India who was present on the day.  The blame for that miscalculation was, uniquely, handed to Gough.

That is a brief analysis of the Battle of Mudki.  I find it an interesting engagement and we will revisit on the table top.